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Here is the .pdf file you can print out.

Wisconsin Permit to Carry Application

 

Some .pdf documents regarding the law which may go into effect Nov 1, 2011

NRA summary of the WI carry law

A senior staff attorney's explanation to a WI Senator

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Bill

Superior, WI Police Department informational web page with links to the permit bill

As soon as the renewal application is published, it will be posted.

Here is the Wisconsin DOJ web site page that has the latest information about the application process and forms.

http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/ConcealedCarry/ConcealedCarry.asp

The legislature relaxed some of the DOJ certificate requirements

http://www.wisinfo.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2011111130418

Here is the latest on WI reciprocity.

http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/ConcealedCarry/reciprocity.asp


Please see www.handgunlaw.us  for more information

Selected WI Statutes

http://legis.wisconsin.gov/rsb/Statutes.html

http://nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&d=stats&jd=ch.%20939

SUBCHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

 

939.14 Criminal conduct or contributory negligence of

victim no defense. It is no defense to a prosecution for a crime

that the victim also was guilty of a crime or was contributorily negligent.

A jury instruction that a defrauded party had no duty to investigate fraudulent representations

was correct. Lambert v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 590, 243 N.W.2d 524 (1976).

This section does not prevent considering the victim’s negligence in relation to

causation. This section only means that a defendant is not immune from prosecution

merely because the victim has been negligent. State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183,

556 N.W.2d 90 (1996), 94−2187.

 

939.22

(10) “Dangerous weapon” means any firearm, whether

loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon and capable

of producing death or great bodily harm; any ligature or other

instrumentality used on the throat, neck, nose, or mouth of another

person to impede, partially or completely, breathing or circulation

of blood; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (4); or any

other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or

intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or

great bodily harm.

(14) “Great bodily harm” means bodily injury which creates

a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement,

or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other

serious bodily injury.

(38) “Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury that

causes a laceration that requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive;

any fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a

temporary loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion;

or a loss or fracture of a tooth.

(42) “Under the influence of an intoxicant” means that the

actor’s ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm or airgun is

materially impaired because of his or her consumption of an alcohol

beverage, of a controlled substance or controlled substance

analog under ch. 961, of any combination of an alcohol beverage,

controlled substance and controlled substance analog, or of any

other drug or of an alcohol beverage and any other drug.

 

939.23 Criminal intent.

(1) When criminal intent is an element

of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, such intent is indicated by the

term “intentionally”, the phrase “with intent to”, the phrase “with

intent that”, or some form of the verbs “know” or “believe”.

(2) “Know” requires only that the actor believes that the specified

fact exists.

(3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a purpose to

do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her

conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition,

except as provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of

those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal

and which are set forth after the word “intentionally”.

(4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the actor

either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified,

or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause

that result.

(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the

existence or constitutionality of the section under which the actor

is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that section.

(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the

age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime

in question.

History: 1979 c. 89; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 486.

Judicial Council Note, 1988: Subs. (3) and (4) are conformed to the formulation

of s. 2.02 (2) (b) ii of the model penal code. [Bill 191−S]

A person need not foresee or intend the specific consequences of an act in order

to possess the requisite criminal intent and is presumed to intend the natural and probable

consequences of the act. State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973).

Instructions on intent to kill created a permissible rebuttable presumption that

shifted the burden of production to the defendant, but not the burden of persuasion.

Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).

The court properly refused to instruct the jury on a “mistake of fact” defense when

the accused claimed that the victim moved into the path of a gunshot intended only

to frighten the victim. State v. Bougneit, 97 Wis. 2d 687, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Ct. App.

1980).

The constitutionality of sub. (3) is upheld. State v. Smith, 170 Wis. 2d 701, 490

N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1992).

The trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s proffered expert and lay

testimony regarding posttraumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder

trial without valid justification violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and

to testify on her own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999).

 

939.24 Criminal recklessness.

(1) In this section, “criminal

recklessness” means that the actor creates an unreasonable and

substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human

being and the actor is aware of that risk, except that for purposes

of ss. 940.02 (1m), 940.06 (2) and 940.23 (1) (b) and (2) (b),

“criminal recklessness” means that the actor creates an unreasonable

and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to an unborn

child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or to

another and the actor is aware of that risk.

(2) Except as provided in ss. 940.285, 940.29, 940.295, and

943.76, if criminal recklessness is an element of a crime in chs.

939 to 951, the recklessness is indicated by the term “reckless” or

“recklessly”.

(3) A voluntarily produced intoxicated or drugged condition

is not a defense to liability for criminal recklessness if, had the

actor not been in that condition, he or she would have been aware

of creating an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great

bodily harm to another human being.

History: 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 56 s. 259; 1993 a. 445; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.

Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section is new. It provides a uniform definition

of criminal recklessness, the culpable mental state of numerous offenses. Recklessness

requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of

human death or great bodily harm and the actor’s subjective awareness of that risk.

Sub. (3) continues the present rule that a voluntarily produced intoxicated or

drugged condition is not a defense to liability for criminal recklessness. Ameen v.

State, 51 Wis. 2d 175, 185 (1971). Patterned on s. 2.08 of the model penal code, it

premises liability on whether the actor would have been aware if not in such condition

of the risk of death or great bodily harm. The commentaries to s. 2.08, model penal

code, state the rationale of this rule in extended fashion. [Bill 191−S]

 

939.25 Criminal negligence.

(1) In this section, “criminal

negligence” means ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting

of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial

and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another,

except that for purposes of ss. 940.08 (2), 940.10 (2) and 940.24

(2), “criminal negligence” means ordinary negligence to a high

degree, consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates

a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm

to an unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn

child or to another.

(2) If criminal negligence is an element of a crime in chs. 939

to 951 or s. 346.62, the negligence is indicated by the term “negligent”

or “negligently”.

History: 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 56 s. 259; 1997 a. 180, 295.

Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section is new. It provides a uniform definition

of criminal negligence, patterned on prior ss. 940.08 (2), 940.24 (2) and 941.01 (2).

Criminal negligence means the creation of a substantial and unreasonable risk of

death or great bodily harm to another, of which the actor should be aware. [Bill

191−S]

The definition of criminal negligence as applied to homicide by negligent operation

of a vehicle is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 180,

515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994).

 

939.45 Privilege. The fact that the actor’s conduct is privileged,

although otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for

any crime based on that conduct. The defense of privilege can be

claimed under any of the following circumstances:

(1) When the actor’s conduct occurs under circumstances of

coercion or necessity so as to be privileged under s. 939.46 or

939.47; or

(2) When the actor’s conduct is in defense of persons or property

under any of the circumstances described in s. 939.48 or

939.49; or

(3) When the actor’s conduct is in good faith and is an apparently

authorized and reasonable fulfillment of any duties of a public

office; or

(4) When the actor’s conduct is a reasonable accomplishment

of a lawful arrest; or

(5) (a) In this subsection:

1. “Child” has the meaning specified in s. 948.01 (1).

3. “Person responsible for the child’s welfare” includes the

child’s parent, stepparent or guardian; an employee of a public or

private residential home, institution or agency in which the child

resides or is confined or that provides services to the child; or any

other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential

setting.

(b) When the actor’s conduct is reasonable discipline of a child

by a person responsible for the child’s welfare. Reasonable discipline

may involve only such force as a reasonable person believes

is necessary. It is never reasonable discipline to use force which

is intended to cause great bodily harm or death or creates an unreasonable

risk of great bodily harm or death.

(6) When for any other reason the actor’s conduct is privileged

by the statutory or common law of this state.

History: 1979 c. 110 s. 60 (1); 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1995 a. 214.

The privilege under sub. (3) for public officials acting with apparent authority did

not apply to a volunteer fire fighter driving while under the influence of an intoxicant.

State v. Schoenheide, 104 Wis. 2d 114, 310 N.W.2d 650 (Ct. App. 1981).

A foster parent is a “person legally responsible for the child’s welfare” under sub.

(5). State v. West, 183 Wis. 2d 46, 515 N.W.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1994).

A mother’s live−in boyfriend did not have parental immunity under sub. (5). The

boyfriend did not have legal responsibility for the mother’s children, and the term

“parent” will not be interpreted to include persons in loco parentis. State v. Dodd,

185 Wis. 2d 560, 518 N.W.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1994)

A convicted felon’s possession of a firearm is privileged under sub. (6) in limited

enumerated circumstances. State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 556 N.W.2d 701

(1996), 95−0917.

The common law privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest is abrogated. State

v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), 96−0914.

There is no statutory or common law privilege for the crime of carrying a concealed

weapon under s. 941.23. State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999),

97−1423.

Under the facts of the case, the privilege of self−defense was inapplicable to a

charge of carrying a concealed weapon. State v. Nollie, 2002 WI 4, 249 Wis. 2d 538,

638 N.W.2d 280, 00−0744.

Sub. (6) incorporates excusable homicide by accident or misfortune. Accident is

a defense that negatives intent. If a person kills another by accident, the killing could

not have been intentional. Accident must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt

when a defendant raises it as a defense. When the state proves intent to kill beyond

a reasonable doubt, it necessarily disproves accident. State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101,

255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244, 00−0064.

A defendant may demonstrate that he or she was acting lawfully, a necessary element

of an accident defense, by showing that he or she was acting in lawful self−

defense. Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation

of s. 941.20, under s. 939.48 (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person

in self−defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary

to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference.

State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244, 00−0064.

To overcome the privilege of parental discipline in sub. (5), the state must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that only one of the following is not met: 1) the use of force

must be reasonably necessary; 2) the amount and nature of the force used must be reasonable;

and 3) the force used must not be known to cause, or create a substantial risk

of, great bodily harm or death. Whether a reasonable person would have believed the

amount of force used was necessary and not excessive must be determined from the

standpoint of the defendant at the time of the defendant’s acts. The standard is what

a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant’s

position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense.

State v. Kimberly B. 2005 WI App 115, 283 Wis. 2d 731, 699 N.W.2d 641, 04−1424.

Testimony supporting the defendant father’s assertion that he was beaten with a

belt as a child was not relevant to whether the amount of force he used in spanking

his daughter was objectively reasonable. A parent may not abuse his or her child and

claim that conduct is reasonable based on his or her history of being similarly abused.

State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, 296 Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W.2d 719, 05−2282.

 

SUBCHAPTER III

DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

 

939.46 Coercion.

(1) A threat by a person other than the

actor’s coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe

that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death

or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him

or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based

on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first−degree intentional

homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd−degree

intentional homicide.

 

939.47 Necessity. Pressure of natural physical forces which

causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only

means of preventing imminent public disaster, or imminent death

or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him

or her so to act, is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based

on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first−degree intentional

homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd−degree

intentional homicide.

History: 1987 a. 399.

Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section is amended by conforming references

to the statute titles created by this bill. Since necessity mitigates first−degree intentional

homicide to 2nd degree, it is obviously not a defense to prosecution for the latter

crime. [Bill 191−S]

The defense of necessity was unavailable to a demonstrator who sought to stop a

shipment of nuclear fuel on the grounds of safety. State v. Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d 572, 299

N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1980).

Heroin addiction is not a “natural physical force” as used in this section. An addict,

caught injecting heroin in jail, who was not provided methadone as had been promised,

was not entitled to assert necessity against a charge of possession of heroin

because his addiction ultimately resulted from his conscious decision to start using

illegal drugs. State v. Anthuber, 201 Wis. 2d 512, 549 N.W.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1996),

95−1365.

 

939.48 Self−defense and defense of others.

(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against

another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person

reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or

her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use

only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes

is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor

may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause

death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes

that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great

bodily harm to himself or herself.

(2) Provocation affects the privilege of self−defense as follows:

(a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely

to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke

an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self−defense

against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a

type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably

believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or

great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the

unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self−defense, but the person

is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely

to cause death to the person’s assailant unless the person reasonably

believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable

means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily

harm at the hands of his or her assailant.

(b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the

actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate

notice thereof to his or her assailant.

(c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or

unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse

to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not

entitled to claim the privilege of self−defense.

(3) The privilege of self−defense extends not only to the intentional

infliction of harm upon a real or apparent wrongdoer, but

also to the unintended infliction of harm upon a 3rd person, except

that if the unintended infliction of harm amounts to the crime of

first−degree or 2nd−degree reckless homicide, homicide by negligent

handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire, first−

degree or 2nd−degree reckless injury or injury by negligent handling

of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire, the actor is liable

for whichever one of those crimes is committed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(4) A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person from real or

apparent unlawful interference by another under the same conditions

and by the same means as those under and by which the person

is privileged to defend himself or herself from real or apparent

unlawful interference, provided that the person reasonably

believes that the facts are such that the 3rd person would be privileged

to act in self−defense and that the person’s intervention is

necessary for the protection of the 3rd person.

(5) A person is privileged to use force against another if the

person reasonably believes that to use such force is necessary to

prevent such person from committing suicide, but this privilege

does not extend to the intentional use of force intended or likely

to cause death.

(6) In this section “unlawful” means either tortious or

expressly prohibited by criminal law or both.

History: 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 486; 2005 a. 253.

Judicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (3) is amended by conforming references to the

statute titles as affected by this bill. [Bill 191−S]

When a defendant testified that he did not intend to shoot or use force, he could not

claim self−defense. Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972).

Sub. (2) (b) is inapplicable to a defendant if the nature of the initial provocation is

a gun−in−hand confrontation of an intended victim by a self−identified robber. Under

these circumstances the intended victim is justified in the use of force in the exercise

of the right of self−defense. Ruff v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 713, 223 N.W.2d 446 (1974).

Whether a defendant’s belief was reasonable under subs. (1) and (4) depends, in

part, upon the parties’ personal characteristics and histories and whether events were

continuous. State v. Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 434 N.W.2d 380 (1989).

Evidence of prior specific instances of violence that were known to the accused

may be presented to support a defense of self−defense. The evidence is not limited

to the accused’s own testimony, but the evidence may not be extended to the point that

it is being offered to prove that the victim acted in conformity with his or her violent

tendencies. State v. Daniels, 160 Wis. 2d 85, 465 N.W.2d 633 (1991).

Imperfect self−defense contains an initial threshold element requiring a reasonable

belief that the defendant was terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person.

State v. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).

The reasonableness of a person’s belief under sub. (1) is judged from the position

of a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence in the same situation as the defendant,

not a person identical to the defendant placed in the same situation as the defendant.

A defendant’s psycho−social history showing past violence toward the defendant

is generally not relevant to this objective standard, although it may be relevant, as in

spousal abuse cases, where the actors are the homicide victim and defendant. State

v. Hampton, 207 Wis. 2d 369, 558 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1996).

The right to resist unlawful arrest is not part of the statutory right to self−defense.

It is a common law privilege that is abrogated. State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 577

N.W.2d 825 (1998), 96−0914.

While there is no statutory duty to retreat, whether the opportunity to retreat was

available goes to whether the defendant reasonably believed the force used was necessary

to prevent an interference with his or her person. A jury instruction to that

effect was proper. State v. Wenger, 225 Wis. 2d 495, 593 N.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1999),

98−1739.

When a defendant fails to establish a factual basis to raise self−defense, prior specific

acts of violence by the victim have no probative value. The presentation of subjective

testimony by an accused, going to a belief that taking steps in self−defense was

necessary, is not sufficient for the admission of self−defense evidence. State v. Head,

2000 WI App 275, 240 Wis. 2d 162, 622 N.W.2d 9, 99−3071.

Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation of s.

941.20, under sub. (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person in self−

defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary to prevent

or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference.

State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244, 00−0064.

A defendant asserting perfect self−defense against a charge of 1st−degree murder

must meet an objective threshold showing that he or she reasonably believed that he

or she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person

and that the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.

A defendant asserting the defense of unnecessary defensive force s. 940.01 (2) (b) to

a charge of 1st−degree murder is not required to satisfy the objective threshold showing.

State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, 99−3071.

A person may employ deadly force against another, if the person reasonably

believes that force is necessary to protect a 3rd−person or one’s self from imminent

death or great bodily harm, without incurring civil liability for injury to the other.

Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F. 2d 79 (1975).  Self−defense — prior acts of the victim. 1974 WLR 266.

State v. Camacho: The Judicial Creation of an Objective Element to Wisconsin’s

Law of Imperfect Self−defense Homicide. Leiser. 1995 WLR 742.

 

939.49 Defense of property and protection against

retail theft. (1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally

use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating

what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful

interference with the person’s property. Only such degree of force

or threat thereof may intentionally be used as the actor reasonably

believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. It

is not reasonable to intentionally use force intended or likely to

cause death or great bodily harm for the sole purpose of defense

of one’s property.

(2) A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person’s property

from real or apparent unlawful interference by another under the

same conditions and by the same means as those under and by

which the person is privileged to defend his or her own property

from real or apparent unlawful interference, provided that the person

reasonably believes that the facts are such as would give the

3rd person the privilege to defend his or her own property, that his

or her intervention is necessary for the protection of the 3rd person’s

property, and that the 3rd person whose property the person

is protecting is a member of his or her immediate family or household

or a person whose property the person has a legal duty to protect,

or is a merchant and the actor is the merchant’s employee or

agent. An official or adult employee or agent of a library is privileged

to defend the property of the library in the manner specified

in this subsection.

(3) In this section “unlawful” means either tortious or

expressly prohibited by criminal law or both.

History: 1979 c. 245; 1981 c. 270; 1993 a. 486.

Flight on the part of one suspected of a felony does not, of itself, warrant the use

of deadly force by an arresting officer, and it is only in certain aggravated circumstances

that a police officer may shoot a fleeing suspect. Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F.

Supp. 544 (1973).

 

APPENDIX F – WIS. STAT. § 895.62

 

 

895.62 Use of force in response to unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business; civil liability immunity.[1]

 

(1) In this section:

 

(a) "Actor" means a person who uses force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person.

 

(b) "Dwelling" has the meaning given in s. 895.07(1)(h).

 

(c) "Place of business" means a business that the actor owns or operates.

 

(2) Except as provided in sub. (4), an actor is immune from civil liability arising out of his or her use of force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the actor reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person and either of the following applies:

 

(a) The person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering the actor's dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, the actor was on his or her property or present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring.

 

(b) The person against whom the force was used was in the actor's dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business after unlawfully and forcibly entering it, the actor was present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business.

 

(3) If sub. (2)(a) or (b) applies, the finder of fact may not consider whether the actor had an opportunity to flee or retreat before he or she used force and the actor is presumed to have reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person.

 

(4) The presumption described in sub. (3) does not apply if any of the following are true:

 

(a) The actor was engaged in a criminal activity or was using his or her dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business to further a criminal activity at the time he or she used the force described in sub. (2).

 

(b) The person against whom the force was used was a public safety worker, as defined in s. 941.375(1)(b), who entered or attempted to enter the actor's dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business in the performance of his or her official duties. This paragraph applies only if at least one of the following applies:

 

1. The public safety worker identified himself or herself to the actor before the force described in sub. (2) was used by the actor.

 

2. The actor knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter his or her dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business was a public safety worker.

 

(5) In any civil action, if a court finds that a person is immune from civil liability under sub. (2), the court shall award the person reasonable attorney fees, costs, compensation for loss of income, and other costs of the litigation reasonably incurred by the person.

 

(6) Nothing in this section may be construed to limit or impair any defense to civil or criminal liability otherwise available.


 

[1] 2011 Wisconsin Act 94 created § 895.62 and § 939.48(1m) relating to self-defense, effective December 21, 2011.

 

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